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"WRONG BUT REASONABLE": THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT PARTICULARITY REQUIREMENT
AFTER UNITED STATES V. LEON
I. Introduction
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution requires
that warrants describe with particularity the places to be searched
and the things to be seized.' The insertion of this clause into the
Constitution stemmed from the Revolutionary War era antipathy
toward highly intrusive general searches. 2 The particularity clause
guaranteed that government agents could no longer rely on indis-
criminate or overbroad warrants to engage in "general, exploratory
rummaging in a person's belongings." 3 Since 1914, the federal remedy
for violations of this particularity requirement has been the exclu-
1. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
[w]arrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by [o]ath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
2. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-27 (1886); see also Maryland v.
Garrison, 107 S. Ct. 1013, 1017 (1987); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192,
195-96 (1927); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914). The colonial
aversion to general searches arose from the enormous invasions to possessory and
privacy interests occasioned by colonial "writs of assistance." Modeled after the
general warrants used by the British domestically to search for evidence of sedition,
these writs gave the government virtually unfettered authority to search for and
seize smuggled goods. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 624-25. In response to such practices,
the framers drafted the fourth amendment to "deny to government ... desired
means, efficient means, and means that must inevitably appear from time to time
... to be the absolutely necessary means, for government to obtain legitimate and
laudable objectives." Amsterdam, Perspectives On The Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REv. 349, 353 (1974); see also Galloway, Fourth Amendment Ban on
General Searches and Seizures, 10 SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP. 141, 141-48 (11983)
[hereinafter Galloway].
3. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971). The Supreme Court
effectively summarized the purpose of the particularity clause in Marron: "The
requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes
general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under
a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the
discretion of the officer executing the warrant." Marron, 275 U.S. at 196; see also
Galloway, supra note 2, at 144.
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sionary rule, which requires the exclusion of unlawfully obtained
evidence from use at trial. 4
The Supreme Court created a "good-faith exception" to the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule in United States v. Leon.5 Under this
exception, the exclusionary rule does not apply when law enforcement
officers have acted in objective "reasonable reliance ' 6 on a warrant
subsequently found to be invalid.7 The purpose of the exclusionary
rule is to deter law enforcement officers from engaging in unlawful
police practices. 8 The Court reasoned that it is therefore both im-
practical and illogical to impose the costs of exclusion on officers
who have not engaged in the type of unreasonable behavior that
the exclusionary rule was designed to prevent. 9
In Leon, the Supreme Court held that the suppression of evidence
will continue to be appropriate "only if it can be said that the law
enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged
with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the
4. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The Supreme Court
extended the exclusionary rule to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
5. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Courts used the term "good-faith exception" prior to
Leon. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 255 (1983). Currently, under Leon,
the terms "reasonable reliance" and "good-faith" exception are used interchange-
ably. United States v. Savoca, 761 F.2d 292, 294 n.1 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 852 (1985).
6. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922.
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., id. at 906; United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974);
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). Leon concluded that because
the exclusion of evidence can have no deterrent effect on the issuing magistrate,
the exclusionary rule should never apply when the magistrate is the source of the
warrant's illegality. Leon, 468 U.S. at 916-17. The good-faith exception also can
be justified on a cost-benefit analysis, wherein the court determines that the cost
of the loss of probative evidence would outweigh any minimal benefit derived from
applying the exclusionary rule when officers have acted reasonably. Id. at 922.
The Court has justifed the exclusionary rule as a personal constitutional right
of the aggrieved party. See, e.g., Leon, 468 U.S. at 934-38 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655-57; Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393, 398. One commentator has
observed that by extending the exclusionary rule to the states via the 14th amendment
in Mapp, the Supreme Court acknowledged the rule as an "indispensable element
of individual fourth amendment protections." Bloom, United States v. Leon And
Its Ramifications, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 247, 249 (1985) [hereinafter Bloom].
Nevertheless, the deterrence rationale is the approach currently favored by the
Court. Leon, 468 U.S. at 916; Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347. Reliance on any other
theory behind the exclusionary rule would render a discussion of the good-faith
exception unnecessary because no other policy justifies admission of unconstitu-
tionally obtained evidence.
9. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918-22 (1984).
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[f]ourth [a]mendment."' 0 The Court described four situations in
which it would be reasonable to charge an officer with knowledge
that a search was illegal." One such situation is when "a warrant
[is] . .. so facially deficient-i.e., in failing to particularize the place
to be searched or the things to be seized-that the executing officers
cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. '1' 2 The first case to deal
with the application of the good-faith exception to a particularity-
defective warrant was Massachusetts v. Sheppard,3 decided the same
day as Leon.
This Note analyzes the application of the good-faith exception to
particularity violations. The question compelled by Leon and Shep-
pard is when, if ever, a particularity-defective warrant will sustain
an officer's "reasonable reliance.' ' 4 Part II of the Note briefly
discusses how "particularity" traditionally has been assessed under
the fourth amendment. Part III examines the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Massachusetts v. Sheppard, and contrasts several circuit court
cases that have applied Sheppard's "objectively reasonable" standard
of good faith to warrants involving particularity defects. Part IV
then compares these cases with a recent Second Circuit opinion,
United States v. Buck, 5 which utilized a somewhat different approach
in finding reasonable reliance. Finally, the Note concludes that the
approach taken by the court in Buck is preferable because it en-
courages courts to establish clearer standards for the particularity
of warrants under the fourth amendment.
10. Id. at 919 (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975))
(emphasis added).
11. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.
12. Id. The Court noted three other situations, not specifically addressed in
this Note, in which the good-faith exception does not apply: (1) when the magistrate
issued the warrant in reliance on a deliberately or recklessly false affidavit; (2)
when the magistrate has wholly abandoned his judicial role and failed to perform
a neutral and detached function; and (3) when the warrant is so lacking in indicia
of probable cause as to render official belief in it unreasonable. Id. For a general
discussion of the holding in Leon, see LaFave, "The Seductive Call Of Expediency":
United States v. Leon, Its Rationale and Ramifications, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 895
[hereinafter LaFave].
13. 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
14. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23; Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 988. Chief Judge Patricia
Wald of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has noted the "semantic
paradox in making courts decide-as Leon will require them to do-whether the
police behaved reasonably in conducting an unreasonable search." Wald, The
Unreasonable Reasonableness Test for Fourth Amendment Searches, 4 CRIM. JUST.
ETics 2, 2 (1985) [hereinafter Wald].
15. 813 F.2d 588 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 167 (1987).
1988]
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL [Vol. XVI
II. Traditional Fourth Amendment Standards for Particularity
The courts address the question of whether a warrant is particular
enough under the fourth amendment on a case-by-case basis.1 6 The
ultimate inquiry, however, always is whether the terms of the warrant
limited the discretion of the officer who executed it.' 7 This ensures
that an unconstitutional general search did not occur.'" Thus, courts
traditionally have considered a variety of circumstantial factors, in
addition to the actual language of the warrant itself, in order to
assess a warrant's compliance with the fourth amendment particu-
larity requirement.19 These factors include: (1) whether probable cause
existed to support seizure of or a search for all items or places
described in the warrant;20 (2) whether, in light of the nature of the
crime2 and of the evidence sought,22 the warrant contains objective
standards by which searchers can differentiate items that can be
seized from those that cannot;23 (3) whether the warrant contains
sufficient information to preclude a mistaken search of the wrong
premises; 24 and (4) whether certain items or places could have been
16. See United States v. Johnson, 541 F.2d 1311, 1314 (8th Cir. 1976).
17. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927).
18. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
19. See generally 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT §§ 4.5-4.6, at 206-60 (1978 & Supp. 1987) [hereinafter LAFAVE, TREA-
TISE].
20. Maryland v. Garrison, 107 S. Ct. 1013, 1017 (1987) (quoting United States
v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982)) ("the scope of a lawful search is 'defined by
the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe
that it may be found' "); United States v. Hinton, 219 F.2d 324, 325 (7th Cir.
1955) ("[t]he command to search can never include more than is covered by the
showing of probable cause to search"); see also Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S.
463, 481 n.10 (1976); Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498 (1925); United States
v. Bentley, 825 F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 240 (1987);
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 716 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Offices Known as 50 State Distrib. Co., 708 F.2d 1371, 1374 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1021 (1984); United States v. Cortellesso, 601 F.2d 28, 32 (1st
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1072 (1980).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Weinstein, 762 F.2d 1522, 1532 n.4 (11th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1110 (1986); 50 State, 708 F.2d at 1374; United States
v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343, 1349 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 814
(1983); United States v. Hillyard, 677 F.2d 1336, 1340 (9th Cir. 1982); Cortellesso,
601 F.2d at 32.
22. United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730, 733 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 664 F.2d
289 (1981).
23. Id. at 733 ("warrant must enable the searcher to reasonably ascertain and
identify the things which are authorized to be seized"); see also Wuagneux, 683
F.2d at 1348.
24. Steele, 267 U.S. at 503 (description must be "such that the officer with a
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more particularly described in light of the information available at
the time. 2 In addition, an inadequacy in the warrant's language
may be cured by prior experience or personal knowledge on the
part of the executing officers26 or by the existence of a more detailed
affidavit attached to or incorporated into the warrant.2 1
Courts customarily apply these general criteria "with a practical
margin of flexibility. "28 The courts tolerate some degree of ambiguity
in a warrant's descriptiveness if law enforcement officers did the
search warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended").
The determining factor as to whether the premises to be searched are described
adequately is:
[Niot whether the description given is technically accurate in every detail
but rather whether the description is sufficient to enable the executing
officer to locate and identify the premises with reasonable effort, and
whether there is any reasonable probability that another premises might
be mistakenly searched which is not the one intended to be searched.
United States v. Darensbourg, 520 F.2d 985, 987 (5th Cir. 1975); see also United
States v. Ellison, 793 F.2d 942, 947 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 415 (1986);
United States v. Gitcho, 601 F.2d 369, 371 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 871
(1979); United States v. Prout, 526 F.2d 380, 387-88 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 840 (1976).
25. See Maryland v. Garrison, 107 S. Ct. 1013, 1017 (1987); United States v.
Young, 745 F.2d 733, 759 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985);
United States v. Offices Known as 50 State Distrib. Co., 708 F.2d 137i, 1374 (9th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1021 (1984); United States v. Cortellesso, 601
F.2d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1072 (1980); United States v.
Johnson, 541 F.2d 1311, 1314 (8th Cir. 1976).
26. See United States v. Bonner, 808 F.2d 864, 865-66 (1st Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 1632 (1987); United States v. Burke, 784 F.2d 1090, 1093 (lth
Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1174 (1986); United States v. Turner, 770 F.2d 1508,
1511 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1026 (1986); United States v. McCain,
677 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1982). In evaluating the sufficiency of a description, courts
may consider the coincidence of an officer both swearing the affidavit and executing
the warrant, because the affiant officer usually has greater knowledge about the
proper scope of the warrant. State v. Sapp, 110 Idaho 153, 155, 715 P.2d 366,
368 (Ct. App. 1986).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Fannin, 817 F.2d 1379, 1383 (9th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Hayes, 794 F.2d 1348, 1354-55 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 1289 (1987); 50 State, 708 F.2d at 1375; United States v. Hillyard, 677 F.2d
1336, 1340 (9th Cir. 1982). But see United States v. Wuagnuex, 683 F.2d 1343,
1351 n.6 (lth Cir. 1982) (when agents had prior opportunity to read affidavit
and brought it to search, requirement that affidavit be incorporated and attached
is flexible), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 814 (1983).
28. Wuagnuex, 683 F.2d at 1349. The fourth amendment does not require that
legal descriptions possess the same degree of detail as would be necessary in property
transactions; warrants are sufficiently descriptive when they "provide reasonable
guidance to the exercise of informed discretion in the officer executing the warrant."
United States v. Faul, 748 F.2d 1204, 1219 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S.
1027 (1985); see also Ellison, 793 F.2d at 947.
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best they reasonably could have done under the circumstances.2 9 For
instance, police must have acquired all the descriptive facts that a
reasonable investigation would be expected to uncover,30 and have
made sure that all those facts were included in the warrant.3
A. Descriptions of Places
Warrants authorizing a search of a place must contain a description
sufficient to prevent a search of the wrong premises.12 Particularity
as applied to a place refers to a single living unit or residence."
When a building contains more than one occupancy unit, the warrant
must describe the particular units or subunits for which there is
probable cause to search, unless the officers could not possibly have
detected or known of the building's multi-occupancy character be-
forehand .14
In Maryland v. Garrison,35 the Supreme Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of a search conducted pursuant to a warrant that
authorized a search of "the premises known as 2036 Park Avenue
third floor apartment. '36 Although there actually were two separate
apartments on the third floor, all of the information reasonably
available to the police at the time they applied for the warrant
indicated that the sole occupant of the third floor was Lawrence
McWebb, whose apartment was the legitimate object of the search.3 7
Thus, despite the overbreadth of the warrant's description and the
resulting search of an apartment other than McWebb's, the court
nevertheless held that the search did not violate the fourth amend-
ment.31
A warrant that contains an incorrect street address will not nec-
essarily render the entire warrant invalid. 39 This is because there are
29. United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 759 (2d Cir. 1984).
30. Id.
31. Id.; see also LAFAVE, TREATISE, supra note 19, § 4.6(a), at 238.
32. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
33. United States v. Hinton, 219 F.2d 324, 326 (7th Cir. 1955).
34. United States v. Parmenter, 531 F. Supp. 975, 978-79 (D. Mass. 1982).
35. 107 S. Ct. 1013 (1987).
36. Id. at 1015.
37. Id. at 1015, 1018-19.
38. Id. at 1019. The Court observed that any knowledge, acquired after the
officers obtained the warrant, regarding the possibility that there was more than
one apartment on the third floor could have no bearing on whether the warrant
was valid as originally issued. See id. at 1017.
39. See, e.g., United States v. Burke, 784 F.2d 1090, 1092-93 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1174 (1986); United States v. Figueroa, 720 F.2d 1239, 1243 n.5
(11th Cir. 1983), reh'g denied, 726 F.2d 755 (1984); United States v. Melancon,
462 F.2d 82, 94 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1038 (1972).
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a number of other factors that can cure such a defect so as to
ensure that the correct place is actually the one searched. These
supplementary factors include: (1) a highly particular description in
the warrant of the place to be searched; ° (2) an address in the
warrant reasonably descriptive of the location intended; 41 (3) sur-
veillance of the premises prior to the search; 42 and (4) execution of
the warrant by an officer who had participated in applying for the
warrant and who personally knew which premises was the one
intended to be searched. 43
The presence of any or all of these factors provides objective
guidance as to the lawful scope of the search, 44 thereby enabling
the search to comply with the fourth amendment requirement that
the search be limited to the place actually intended. 45 Thus, in United
States v. Burke,46 the Eleventh Circuit held that a search of an
apartment for stolen payroll checks did not violate the fourth amend-
ment, despite the fact that the affidavit and the warrant each au-
thorized a search of apartment 840 at "[thirty-eight] Throop Street." 47
Brenda Burke actually lived in apartment 840 at "[forty-eight] Troup
Street," which was part of a housing project. 4 This defect did not
invalidate the warrant because, as the search progressed, the executing
officer was directed to the correct apartment by the officer who
originally applied for the warrant, and who in turn had been shown
the location of the apartment by an informant.49 Furthermore, no
"Throop Street" existed in Atlanta, and there was only one apart-
ment 840 in the entire housing project.5 0 Finally, the warrant con-
tained a detailed physical description of the facade of the apartment,
thus ensuring that the officers would locate the correct premises
despite the defect in the warrant.5
40. United States v. Turner, 770 F.2d 1508, 1511 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1026 (1986).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Burke, 784 F.2d at 1092-93. Burke is a post-Leon case in which a challenged
warrant was declared constitutional. The Burke court held that in evaluating the
effect of an incorrect street address, a court may consider the personal knowledge
of the executing officer, even if that knowledge is not reflected in either the warrant
or the affidavit. Id. at 1093.
44. See LAFAVE, TREATISE, supra note 19, § 4.5(a), at 208-15.
45. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
46. 784 F.2d 1090 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1174 (1986).
47. Id. at 1091-93.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1091-92.
50. Id. at 1092.
51. Id. at 1092-93. Courts have upheld searches in similar instances: (1) where
19881
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B. Descriptions of Property
1. Intrinsic Limitations on the Warrant
The constitutional requirements for the description of the property
to be seized also are liberally applied.12 All-inclusive "catch-all"
terms used to authorize the seizure of a broad category of property
may be saved from unconstitutional overbreadth by the use of limiting
language or references. 3 For instance, the Supreme Court has held
that the descriptive phrase, "together with other fruits, instrumen-
talities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown, 5 4 did not
render a warrant unconstitutional despite its "catch-all" tail. The
phrase had to be read in the context of the earlier portions of the
warrant, in which the crime was fully described and the targeted
property listed. 5 Thus, even if certain phrases by themselves would
be too general, a search will not be constitutionally infirm as long
as its lawful scope can be understood from a reading of the warrant
as a whole.5 6
Reference in a warrant to a crime by statute may also limit the
scope of the search. 7 The named statute, however, must specifically
one part of the description was inaccurate, but the remainder absolutely identified
the premises, United States v. Shropshire, 498 F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1974), cert.
dismissed, 420 U.S. 901 (1975); (2) where the premises to be searched adjoined
those described and both were under the defendant's control, United States v.
Melancon, 462 F.2d 82 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1038 (1972); and (3)
where an incorrect address which was reasonably close to the location intended
did not exist, making a search of the wrong place impossible and making a search
of the right place likely, United States v. Gitcho, 601 F.2d 369 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 871 (1979).
52. See generally LAFAVE, TREATISE, supra note 19, § 4.6(a), at 234.
53. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1975); United States v. Young, 745
F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985); United States V.
Dunloy, 584 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1978).
54. Andresen, 427 U.S. at 479.
55. Id. at 480-81. The challenged warrant in Andresen referred in great detail
to extensive documentary evidence of fraudulent real estate transactions which
violated specific Maryland statutes. Id.
56. Id.; see also United States v. Jacob, 657 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1981) ("a
sufficiently particular qualifying phrase may have the effect of bringing an otherwise
'general' warrant within the constitutional standard"), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 942
(1982); United States v. Abrams, 615 F.2d 541, 547 (1st Cir. 1980) (reading Andresen
to mean that general "tail" of search warrant will not defeat sufficiently particular
body of warrant).
57. See, e.g., Rickert v. Sweeney, 813 F.2d 907, 909 (8th Cir. 1987); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 716 F.2d 493, 499 (8th Cir. 1983). But see United States
v. Mankani, 738 F.2d 538, 546 (2d Cir. 1984) (warrant authorizing seizure of all
invoices and records as evidence of violations of specific fraudulent transaction
held not overbroad).
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refer to an identifiable offense, rather than to a broad range of
crimes, so that the instrumentalities of the crime may readily be
ascertained.18 For instance, a warrant's references to the general
conspiracy statute, section 371 of title 18 of the United States Code,
and to the general tax evasion statutes, sections 7201 and 7206(2)
of title 26 of the United States Code, were held not to provide any
substantive limit on a search; rather, they authorized a general
rummaging through all of a company's business records,5 9 which
was inappropriate in view of the fact that there was probable cause
to seize only evidence of tax evasion in one particular project. 60
The use of generic language to describe the items subject to seizure
does not necessarily make the warrant overbroad, if a more specific
description is not possible. 6' For instance, when there is probable
cause to believe that the premises to be searched contain a class of
generic items or goods, a portion of which are suspected of being
stolen or contraband, a warrant may authorize inspection of the
entire class of goods. 62 Such a general authorization, however, must
be accompanied by certain articulated standards that enable the
executing officers to distinguish between legally and illegally possessed
property. 63
In United States v. Hillyard,64 the warrant at issue authorized a
search of all vehicles at a particular location, and seizure of those
suspected of being stolen, based on the fact that there was probable
cause to believe that vehicles other than those known to be actually
present had been stolen. 65 In addition, it was known that the suspect,
Hillyard, had a seven-year history of transporting stolen vehicles.
66
The Ninth Circuit held that the search was constitutional because
the affidavit contained instructions whereby the officers could dis-
58. Rickert, 813 F.2d at 909; see also United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592,
602 (10th Cir. 1988) ("[aln unadorned reference to a broad federal-statute does
not sufficiently limit the scope of a search warrant").
59. Rickert, 813 F.2d at 909.
60. Id.
61. See, e.g., United States v. Bentley, 825 F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 240 (1987); United States v. Hillyard, 677 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th
Cir. 1982); United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730, 733 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 664
F.2d 289 (1981).
62. Hillyard, 677 F.2d at 1340; Cook, 657 F.2d at 733.
63. Hillyard, 677 F.2d at 1339.
64. 677 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1982).
65. Id. at 1340.
66. Id.
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tinguish stolen from legally possessed vehicles by comparing altered
identification numbers with lists of true numbers. 67
Finally, when a business is searched for documents or records,
enough specificity is required to ensure that only those documents
that pertain to the crime will be seized, and that other papers will
remain private. 6s Thus, in United States v. Cardwell,69 the warrant's
specification that the business papers sought be evidence of violations
of the general tax evasion statute was deemed to be an insufficient
limitation on the search.70 Instead, the court held that the "warrant
must contain some guidelines to aid the determination of what may
or may not be seized."'"
2. Extrinsic Limitations on the Warrant
Despite the fundamental requirement that a warrant provide some
way to distinguish the specific objects of the search, warrants con-
taining generic descriptions of property that do not also provide
methods by which to differentiate between unlawful and legitimately
possessed goods have been upheld under the fourth amendment in
several types of situations. Where there is probable cause to believe
that unlawful items of a common nature dominate the area or
property subject to the search, generic language is permissible.7 2 In
such a case, "there is no obligation to show that the [items] sought
* . . necessarily are the ones stolen [or otherwise unlawful], but only
to show circumstances indicating this to be likely." '73
67. Id. at 1341; cf. Montilla Records of Puerto Rico v. Morales, 575 F.2d 324
(1st Cir. 1978) (warrant authorizing seizure of sound recordings manufactured in
violation of Copyright Act held insufficiently particular because it failed to limit
search to products bearing Motown label, the only items for which there was
probable cause to search); United States v. Klein, 565 F.2d 183, 188 (1st Cir. 1977)
(warrant authorizing seizure of "certain 8-track tapes and tape cartridges which
are unauthorized 'pirate' reproductions" held insufficiently particular because it
contained no clear method by which searching officer could identify the "pirated"
tapes prior to seizure).
68. United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 603 n.18 (10th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Cardwell, 680 F.2d 75, 77-78 (9th Cir. 1982).
69. 680 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1982).
70. Id. at 77.
71. Id. at 78. In Cardwell, the IRS agents had done a thorough investigation,
and knew exactly which records were needed to satisfy the search. Id.
72. See, e.g., United States v. Cortellesso, 601 F.2d 28, 31-32 (1st Cir. 1979)
(warrant that failed to provide means by which to differentiate between stolen and
legitimate goods held valid because there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate
large number of stolen goods warehoused in premises to be searched, and premises
were maintained solely for this purpose), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1072 (1980).
73. Vitali v. United States, 383 F.2d 121, 122 (1st Cir. 1967); see also United
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In addition, no differentiating mechanism is necessary when the
"items described are contraband by their very nature, '74 such as
"illegal narcotic drugs, '7 5 or "when the circumstances of the crime
make an exact description of the fruits and instrumentalities a virtual
impossibility. '7 6 Stolen property, however, can usually be precisely
described prior to the search, based on the owner's description. 77
Moreover, unlike obvious varieties of contraband such as narcotic
drugs, stolen property may appear innocent on its face, thus requiring
a clearer description in order to prevent wrongful seizure of legit-
imately possessed goods. 78 A generic description of stolen goods may
suffice only when such items cannot for some reason be described
with the otherwise requisite specificity. 79
A relaxed level of particularity is also acceptable in cases where
there is probable cause to believe the existence of a business or
enterprise characterized by pervasive fraud or illegality. 0 When the
States v. Vastola, 670 F. Supp. 1244, 1273-74 (D.N.J. 1987) (warrant that authorized
search for fruits of copyright violations but failed to indicate means by which to
differentiate between legitimate and unlawful property was immunized by probable
cause to infer that illegal items were "dominant elements" of business inventory);
cf. Montilla Records of Puerto Rico v. Morales, 575 F.2d 324, 326 (1st Cir. 1978)
(officers' failure to indicate which recordings were illegitimate where it would have
been easy to do so rendered warrant's description fatally overbroad); United States
v. Klein, 565 F.2d 183 (1st Cir. 1977) (warrant neither established existence of
large collection of similar contraband on premises, nor explained known method
by which to distinguish contraband from legitimate goods).
74. State v. Connard, 81 N.C. App. 327, 330, 344 S.E.2d 568, 570 (Ct. App.
1986), aff 'd, 319 N.C. 392, 354 S.E.2d 238 (1987).
75. Id.
76. Spinelli v. United States, 382 F.2d 871, 887 (8th Cir. 1967) (description of
"bookmaking paraphernalia" held adequate in search for secreted gaming equip-
ment, precise nature of which police could not know prior to search), rev'd on
other grounds, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); see also United States v. Faul, 748 F.2d 1204,
1219 (8th Cir. 1984) (search for "any and all firearms" adequate when ballistics
test had not yet been performed because all weapons found on premises were
potential evidence of crime), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985).
77. United States v. Johnson, 541 F.2d 1311, 1314 (8th Cir. 1976).
78. United States v. Burch, 432 F. Supp. 961, 963 (D. Del. 1977), aff 'd, 577
F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1978) (mem.).
79. See, e.g., United States v. Cortellesso, 601 F.2d 28, 32 (1st Cir. 1979) (labels
torn out of stolen clothing made more precise description impossible), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1072 (1980). But see United States v. Fuccillo, 808 F.2d 173 (1st Cir.)
(warrant too general because it lacked clearly available references to brands and
types of clothing sought, thereby permitting mass seizure of all clothes stored on
premises), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2481 (1987).
80. See, e.g., United States v.- Offices Known as 50 State Distrib. Co., 708
F.2d 1371, 1374-75 (9th Cir. 1983) (warrant authorizing seizure of all business-
related records, books and other papers held valid because affidavit detailed probable
cause to believe business was permeated by fraud, and no business records were
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entire business under investigation involves fraud, "the warrant may
be broad because it is unnecessary to distinguish things that may
be taken from those that must be left undisturbed."'" The inves-
tigation of white-collar crimes usually fits this category because it
requires the assembly of a "paper puzzle" from many pieces of
seemingly innocuous information.82
Generic language will not render a warrant invalid when a suf-
ficiently detailed affidavit accompanies and is incorporated by ref-
erence into the warrant.83 The opportunity to refer to an affidavit
for supplementary information provides both the executing officer
and the person whose premises are to be searched with greater
information regarding the authorized objective and scope of the
search.
4
The cases discussed above thus demonstrate that courts have never
imposed a uniform requirement for a certain type of language or
description that will in all cases satisfy the fourth amendment par-
ticularity clause. 85 Instead, "particularity" is comprised of numerous
factors, all of which serve one essential purpose-to ensure that the
scope of every governmental intrusion is limited only to that for
which there is probable cause. 86 This goal has been accomplished
primarily by ensuring that something either in the language of the
segregable from any others), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1021 (1984); United States v.
Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343, 1349 (11th Cir. 1982) (presence of complex financial
transactions and allegations of widespread fraud justified warrant's authorization
of seizure of 11 categories of records), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 814 (1983).
81. United States v. Bentley, 825 F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir.) (warrant setting
out 21 categories of documents, which collectively covered every business document
likely to be in files but excluded personal documents, held not overbroad because
every business transaction was potential evidence of fraud), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 240 (1987). Belief that the business is so pervasively fraudulent, however, must
rest on probable cause; merely restricting the searcher's discretion to select which
business documents to seize does not itself make the warrant sufficiently particular.
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 716 F.2d 493, 499 (8th Cir. 1983).
82. See, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 481 n.10 (1975); Wuagneux,
683 F.2d at 1349.
83. See, e.g., United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 603 (10th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Hillyard, 677 F.2d 1336, 1340 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Klein,
565 F.2d 183, 186 n.3 (1st Cir. 1977); cf. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d at 1351 n.6 (affidavit
need not be attached and incorporated when executing agents brought affidavit to
search, and had prior opportunity to read it); Cortellesso, 601 F.2d at 32 (affidavit,
although unattached, provided necessary guidance as to scope of search).
84. United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 926 (1982); United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152, 1157 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
85. See supra notes 16-31 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 17-84 and accompanying text.
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warrant or accompanying affidavit, 7 or else something inherent in
the circumstances leading up to or surrounding the execution of the
warrant,88 limits the searchers' discretion to go beyond the search
or seizure intended.89
III. Reasonable Reliance on Particularity-Defective Warrants
A. Massachusetts v. Sheppard
The Supreme Court first applied the good-faith exception to a
particularity violation in Massachusetts v. Sheppard,9° which was
United States v. Leon's companion case.91 The challenged warrant
in Sheppard authorized a homicide investigation. 92 In their haste,
however, the officers could find only a preprinted warrant form for
a narcotics search. 93 The officers advised the judge about the special
nature of the warrant. 94 The judge made some changes but, notably,
failed to remove references to controlled substances in the body of
the warrant. 95 Nevertheless, he assured the officers that he had made
all the necessary changes, and that the warrant was valid both in
form and content. 96
The Court held that although the search pursuant to the warrant
violated the fourth amendment, the officers had behaved reasonably
in carrying it out. 97 Despite the warrant's facial overbreadth, the
officers were reasonable in relying on it because they "took every
step that could reasonably be expected of them"98 in order to dispel
their doubts about the warrant's validity. 99 The fact that the officers
consulted with the judge and obtained his guarantee that the warrant
was proper provided the officers with an objectively reasonable basis
87. See supra notes 53-71, 83-84 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 34-51, 72-82 and accompanying text.
89. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 716 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1983) (despite
authorization to take "everything," fact that officer lacks discretion in deciding
what items to seize does not by itself legitimize warrant, unless there also is probable
cause to seize all).
90. 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
91. See supra notes 5-12 and accompanying text.
92. Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 984.
93. Id. at 985.
94. Id. at 986.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 990.
98. Id. at 989.
99. Id.
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to rely on the warrant.' ° The Court declared the following:
Whatever an officer may be required to do when he executes a
warrant without knowing beforehand what items are to be seized,
we refuse to rule that an officer is required to disbelieve a judge
who has just advised him, by word and by action, that the warrant
he possesses authorizes him to conduct the search he has re-
quested. 01
In addition, because the executing officers themselves had applied
for the warrant, they could be presumed to have had greater knowl-
edge about the proper object and scope of the search. 0 2 They
therefore had adequate guidance in executing the admittedly over-
broad warrant. 03
These two factors-the judge's express assurances and the officers'
personal knowledge about the investigation°4-were adequate to sus-
tain the officers' reasonable reliance on the overbroad warrant. 05
The Court declined to speculate "[w]hether an officer who is less
familiar with the warrant application or who has unalleviated con-
cerns about the proper scope of the search would be justified in
100. Id. at 989-90. Exclusion in such a case would be appropriate only if a
reasonably well-trained officer would have perceived that the magistrate had behaved
in an objectively unreasonable manner, such as by issuing a warrant so devoid of
particularity as to authorize a general search. Misner, Limiting Leon: A Mistake
of Law Analogy, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 507, 516 (1986).
101. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 989-90 (1984).
102. Id. at 989; see also LaFave, supra note 12, at 918. As Professor LaFave
has pointed out, inquiry into the officer's knowledge blurs the line between Leon's
purportedly objective inquiry and a subjective one. Id. The question under Leon
thus becomes: what would a reasonably well-trained officer know or deduce from
this officer's experience? Id. at 914.
103. Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 988-89. Conceivably, because the defect in the warrant
was that it described more items than those for which there was probable cause
to search, the part of the warrant referring to controlled substances could have
been severed from the portion that described the specific evidence of homicide
sought. Under the doctrine of partial suppression, "where invalid portions of a
warrant may be stricken and the remaining portions held valid, seizures pursuant
to the valid portions will be sustained." United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959,
967 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1289 (1987); see also United States
v. Diaz, 841 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. Faul, 748 F.2d 1204, 1219
(8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985). If no portion of the warrant,
[however], is sufficiently particularized to pass constitutional muster, then total
suppression is required." United States v. Cardwell, 680 F.2d 75, 78 (9th Cir.
1982). In Spilotro, for example, no portion of the warrant was sufficient to permit
severance. See infra notes 137-48 and accompanying text.
104. Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 988-89.
105. Id. at 990.
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failing to notice a defect like the one in the warrant in this case."' 1 6
B. Reasonable Reliance After Massachusetts v. Sheppard
In Sheppard,0 7 the Supreme Court held that the officers' reliance
on a constitutionally overbroad warrant came within the good-faith
exception because they had "an objectively reasonable basis for
[their] mistaken belief"' 08 that the warrant was sufficiently partic-
ular.'09 In Sheppard, the officers' primary basis for reasonable re-
liance was the judge's assurance that the warrant was valid as
issued." 0 The officers sought assurance because the circumstances
surrounding their application for the warrant put them on notice
of the potential for problems with it."' Had the officers failed to
106. Id. at 989 n.6. The Court also avoided the issues of whether an affiant
who was not aware of a potential problem with the warrant has any duty to
inquire about it, and whether an executor who was not also the affiant has any
obligation to read the affidavit and compare it with the warrant. Presumably, in
either situation, the officer would be unconcerned about the warrant, and therefore
would be free to execute it with the protection of the good-faith exception. See,
e.g., United States v. Accardo, 749 F.2d 1477 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
949 (1985). Because the law requires merely that the officer act reasonably, he
need only seek reassurance when he has some objective basis to doubt the warrant's
validity. The Court did note, however, that "[njormally, when an officer who has
not been involved in the application stage receives a warrant, he will read it in
order to determine the object of the search." Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 989 n.6.
Professor LaFave, on the other hand, concluded that under Sheppard an affiant,
unaware of problems in the warrant, will be excused from reading the warrant
before he executes it, even if he has received no assurances as to the warrant's
validity. LaFave, supra note 12, at 919.
107. 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
108. Id. at 988.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 989-90. Review of a warrant by a government attorney also has
served as a basis for reasonable reliance. The courts in United States v. Michaelian,
803 F.2d 1042 (9th Cir. 1986), United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir.
1986), and United States v. Accardo, 749 F.2d 1477 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 949 (1985), each based a finding of reasonable reliance partially on the fact
that the officers had sought and obtained approval by United States or local
government attorneys prior to submitting the warrant application for approval by
the magistrate. See Michaelian, 803 F.2d at 1047; Freitas, 800 F.2d at 1457; Accardo,
749 F.2d at 1480; see also United States v. Fama, 758 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1985)
(approval of warrant by lawyers may form basis for reasonable reliance). Government
attorneys, however, are just as involved in "the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime," Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948), as are
police, so their assurances may not reflect the ideal of objectivity and neutrality
embodied by a magistrate.
111. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 986 (1984).
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take such actions, their execution of the warrant presumably could
not have been in good faith." 2
Under cases prior to Leon, a search's actual compliance with the
fourth amendment's ban on general searches, rather than the officer's
good-faith belief in the legality of the search, was the sole issue to
be determined..' Since Leon and Sheppard were decided, several
circuit courts have adopted the "objectively reasonable" standard
for applying the good-faith exception to other instances of partic-
ularity violations.114 This has required these cases to distinguish
between warrants that are "so facially deficient""' as to bar reliance
completely ' 6 and those that contain mere "technical" defects." 7 A
"technical" defect in this context refers to an ambiguity, inaccuracy
112. Id. at 989. Assurance by the magistrate is not, however, indispensable. In
United States v. Accardo, the Eleventh Circuit held that absent an unusual level
of suspicion or doubt about the propriety of the warrant such as that expressed
by the officers in Sheppard, officers have no duty to inquire about the sufficiency
of the warrant. Accardo, 749 F.2d at 1480-81. Nevertheless, an officer may not
rely on either the word or action of a judge who has abdicated his neutral and
detached role. See Lo-Ji Sales v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979).
113. See supra notes 16-86 and accompanying text; cf. United States v. Accardo,
749 F.2d 1477, 1481 (lth Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 949 (1985) ("[tihe question
here is not the legal validity of the warrant but the reasonableness of the officers'
reliance on it").
114. See infra notes 122-259 and accompanying text. Professor LaFave sees
Sheppard as more representative of a probable cause deficiency than a particularity
violation because the description in the warrant encompassed classes of items beyond
those for which there was probable cause to seize. LaFave, supra note 12, at 920-
21. This interpretation is problematic, however, because the police in the case made
no effort to establish probable cause for narcotics. Therefore, probable cause actually
may have existed. See Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 985. The problem in Sheppard more
closely resembles the type of particularity violation classified as "general rum-
maging," which is characterized by an overly broad, and thus inadequate, de-
scription. See Galloway, supra note 2, at 144-45.
Alternatively, LaFave questions whether Sheppard actually involved any fourth
amendment violation, In his opinion, "[d]eciding the Sheppard case on a good-
faith basis apparently was ... unnecessary. Considerable authority already existed
to the effect that a defective or erroneous description in a warrant is cured by a
proper description in an affidavit incorporated by reference and attached to the
warrant." LaFave, supra note 12, at 911. Although in Sheppard, the judge failed
to incorporate the affidavit into the warrant, 468 U.S. at 986 (1984), LaFave's
point-that by providing the officers with adequate guidance concerning the le-
gitimate scope of the search, the warrant did comply with the fourth amendment-
applies equally to other cases where the good-faith exception may have been applied
unnecessarily. See, e.g., United States v. Michaelian, 803 F.2d 1042 (9th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Accardo, 749 F.2d 1477 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 949
(1985).
115. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984).
116. See infra notes 122-93 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 90-112; infra notes 194-216 and accompanying text.
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or generality in the actual language of the warrant that would render
the warrant unreliable, if not for the presence of some extrinsic or
intrinsic limitation on the scope of the search."'
Based on this distinction, some courts have concluded that although
a warrant containing a technical defect violated the fourth amend-
ment, the good-faith exception should apply. 1 9 In other situations,
courts have held that the good-faith exception could not apply
because the warrant's description of the legitimate objects of the
search itself was so ambiguous that, unlike the officers in Sheppard,
a well-trained officer must be presumed to have harbored doubts
about it.120 In such cases, the "lack of particularity in the warrant
tells the officer he has been given insufficient direction, and thus
he can hardly reasonably rely upon the warrant. '1 21 A comparison
of these two categories of cases yields markedly different ways of
viewing the good-faith exception and, by extension, the fourth amend-
ment.
1. Cases Where No Basis for Reasonable Reliance Existed
a. United States v. Crozier
The Ninth Circuit on several occasions has confronted warrants
containing descriptions devoid of adequately particularized language
and, moreover, lacking any extrinsic limitation on the warrant's
scope that could serve as an objectively reasonable basis for reli-
ance. 122 In United States v. Crozier,123 drug enforcement agents
obtained warrants to search the homes of two individuals, Stein and
Crozier, whom they suspected of manufacturing narcotics. 24 In ad-
dition to a specific list of items and equipment normally used in
the manufacture of amphetamines, 2 5 the warrant for Crozier's home
118. See supra notes 19-89 and accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., United States v. Michaelian, 803 F.2d 1042 (9th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Accardo, 749 F.2d 1477 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 949 (1985);
cf. United States v. Buck, 813 F.2d 588 (2d Cir.) (good-faith exception applied to
defect in warrant that was more than merely technical), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
167 (1987).
120. See infra notes 122-93 and accompanying text.
121. LaFave, supra note 12, at 921. This exemplifies what LaFave sees as a true
particularity violation. See supra note 114.
122. See infra notes 123-62 and accompanying text.
123. 777 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1985).
124. Id. at 1378.
125. The Crozier warrant authorized a search for "[a]mphetamine, precursor
chemicals including [mlethylamine, P-2-P, [either, and [alicohol, and laboratory
apparatus, notes, formulas, as well as any indicia of ownership and control of the
premises." Id. at 1380.
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authorized the seizure of "any indicia of ownership and control of
the premises.' ' 2 6 Pursuant to this authority, the agents seized papers,
letters, greeting cards and bank statements.2 7 The warrant for Stein's
home, however, directed the agents to seize "[miaterial evidence of
violation [of sections 841, 846 of title 21 of the United States Code]
([m]anufacture and [p]ossession with intent to distribute [ajmphetamine
and [c]onspiracy).' ' 28 As a result, the agents seized Stein's tax returns
and real estate records, and took photographs of gold coins and
jewelry, for which they then obtained a warrant to seize.1 29 Although
the Crozier warrant was deemed sufficiently detailed under the fourth
amendment to justify the search that resulted, the court held that
the Stein warrant authorized a general search for evidence of an
amphetamine business, in violation of the fourth amendment.'30
The court then distinguished the facial overbreadth in the Stein
warrant from the "technical error" committed by the magistrate in
Sheppard.'3 The Crozier court held that there could be no reasonable
reliance on the Stein warrant because it lacked any description of
particular property whatsoever, 32 even though the amount of in-
formation the agents had acquired made a more precise description
possible of the items sought.'33 The court observed that although
the affidavit supporting the Stein warrant contained the same list
of items as that which appeared in the Crozier warrant, the agents
did not have the affidavit with them when they searched Stein's
home. 1 4 Unlike the situation in Sheppard, however, the. failure to
include all the known information in the warrant was that of the
agents, rather than the magistrate."' Therefore, in Crozier the ra-
tionale for applying the good-faith exception was not present.'3 6
b. United States v. Spilotro
Similarly, in United States v. Spilotro,3 7 the Ninth Circuit refused
to apply the good-faith exception to a "hopelessly general" warrant
126. Id. Evidence that indicates ownership or control of the premises to be
searched has been deemed a proper subject for seizure. United States v. Whitten,
706 F.2d 1000, 1009 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984).
127. Crozier, 777 F.2d at 1378.
128. Id. at 1381.
129. Id. at 1379.
130. Id. at 1381.
131. Id. at 1382; see Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 984 (1984).
132. United States v. Crozier, 777 F.2d 1376, 1379 (9th Cir. 1985).
133. Id. at 1381.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1382; see supra notes 4-12 and accompanying text.
137. 800 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1289 (1987).
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that authorized seizure of evidence of violations of thirteen broad
criminal statutes. ,38 The warrant did not satisfy the fourth amendment
because a more precise definition of -the items sought was possible. 3 9
For instance, the warrant either could have described "in greater
detail the items one commonly expects to find on premises used for
the criminal activities in question," or referred to the specific criminal
behavior charged.140 The use of generic language in this case was
not acceptable because the nature of the many crimes encompassed
by the referenced criminal statutes was not described. 41 Moreover,
the police could not rely on the affidavit to cure the warrant's
generality, because it was neither attached to the warrant nor in-
corporated by reference. 42
Following its earlier holding in Crozier, the Ninth Circuit declined
to apply the good-faith exception to this situation, noting the absence
of any assurances by the magistrate that "the overbreadth concern
was without merit.' ' 43 Here, as in Crozier,'4 no reasonably well-
138. Id. at 960-61. The warrant in Spilotro authorized seizure of many items:
[C]ertain property, namely notebooks, notes, documents, address books
and other records; safe deposit box keys, cash, gemstones and other
items of jewelry and other assets; photographs, equipment including
electronic scanning devices, and other items and paraphernalia, which
are evidence of violations of 18 U.S.C. [§§] 1084, 1952, 1955, 892-894,
371, 1503, 1511, 2314, 2315, 1962-1963, and which are or may be: (1)
property that constitutes evidence of the commission of a criminal offense;
or (2) contraband, the fruits of crime, or things otherwise criminally
possessed; or (3) property designed or intended for use or which is or
has been used as the means of committing a criminal offense.
Id. at 961. The court held that this warrant authorized "wholesale seizures of
entire categories of items not generally evidence of criminal activity, and provide[d]
no guidelines to distinguish items used lawfully from those the government had
probable cause to seize." Id. at 964.
139. Spilotro, 800 F.2d at 964.
140. Id.; see also United States v. Fannin, 817 F.2d 1379, 1381 (9th Cir. 1987)
(phrase, "other evidence, at this time unknown," sufficiently clear because crimes
had been discussed and specific suspect items described in attached and incorporated
warrant).
141. Spilotro, 800 F.2d at 964. Contra United States v. Hayes, 794 F.2d 1348
(9th Cir. 1986) (mere references to criminal statutes sufficient because evidence
sought clearly related only to activities involving controlled substances, rather than
broad range of criminal acts), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1289 (1987); United States
v. Mankani, 738 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1984) (reference to statute clearly limited to
specific drug transactions).
142. Spilotro, 800 F.2d at 967. Had the affidavit been attached it probably would
not have been much help because it was a nonindexed, unorganized, daily narration,
and was 157 pages in length with neither a specific list nor detailed description of
the items. Id.
143. United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 968 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 1289 (1987).
144. United States v. Crozier, 777 F.2d 1376, 1382 (9th Cir. 1985).
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trained officer who relied on language this vague could be presumed
to have acted reasonably. 145 This type of situation differed from
that present in Sheppard because in Spilotro the warrant failed, to
describe enough, while the Sheppard warrant described too much.
In Sheppard, the officers had independent knowledge about the
purpose of the search and the crime that had been committed. 146
This at least gave them some guidance as to the type of evidence
for which there was probable cause to search. The Spilotro warrant,
however, contained such a dearth of information that no reasonably
well-trained officer could conclude that it authorized a legal search.147
The officers' failure to dispel this presumed doubt further served
to deprive them of the protection of the good-faith exception. 4
c. United States v. Washington
In United States v. Washington, 49 the Ninth Circuit held that two
out of three challenged sections of a warrant were unconstitutional
as well as so facially deficient as to bar reasonable reliance. 50 Wash-
ington involved a search for business records pertaining to a multi-
state prostitution ring.' Although the court viewed one questionable
section of the warrant as limited enough to satisfy the fourth amend-
ment, 52 it held two other sections constitutionally overbroad.'53 These
two sections authorized officers to search for evidence "tending to
establish the wealth and financial status of Ralph Huey Washington" 14
145. Spilotro, 800 F.2d at 968.
146. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 984-85 (1984).
147. Spilotro, 800 F.2d at 964.
148. Id. at 968.
149. 797 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1986).
150. Id. at 1471-73.
151. Id. at 1463.
152. Id. at 1472. This section authorized the seizure of "records, notes [and]
documents indicating Ralph Washington's involvement and control of prostitution
activity including but not limited to, photographs, handwritten notes, ledger books,
transportation vouchers and tickets, hotel registration, receipts, bank documents
[such] as deposit slips, checks and records, toll records, bail bondsman's receipts
and medical billings .... " Id. (emphasis added). The court held that the challenged
phrase, "but not limited to," did not invalidate the warrant, because the phrase,
"'involvement and control of prostitution activity,' effectively [told] the officers
to seize only items indicating prostitution activity." Id.
153. Id. at 1472-73.
154. Id. at 1472. This section authorized the following seizure:
[A]rticles of personal property tending to establish the wealth and financial
status of Ralph Huey Washington including but not limited to jewelry,
cash, furs, documents showing ownership of stock, bonds, companies,
real estate and other personal property; documents tending to show
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and of his association with an indefinite number of people. 1"1
The court in Washington summarily refused to apply the good-
faith exception to either of these unconstitutional sections. The only
reason the court gave for its holding was that both sections resembled
the type of warrant Leon described as being "so facially deficient"' 15 6
as to bar any presumption of reasonable reliance.1 7 Although the
section regarding Washington's wealth and financial status did include
a lengthy list of items, the description nevertheless was open-ended,
and therefore permitted the police to search far beyond the, items
listed."58 In the other invalidated section, the warrant listed no specific
examples of evidence at all. 159
The court also noted that the affiant for the warrant had crossed
out and.initialed the phrase, "but not -limited to [the following
persons]," in one of the challenged sections.,16 This indicated to the
court that the officer had manifested some doubt as to the legitimacy
of those words.' 61 The officer therefore could not have been ob-
jectively reasonable in executing at least that questionable portion
of the warrant. 162
d. United States v. Fuccillo
In United States v. Fuccillo, 63 the First Circuit held that the good-
faith exception did not apply to three separate, identical warrants,
ownership or control of companies or corporations including but not
limited to Funky Denim, Washington Enterprises, and Francisco-Louisiana
Incorporated; any documents tending to show the preparation of or basis
for United States Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service Tax
Returns.
Id. (emphasis added). The court invalidated this section for lack of probable cause
to suggest a pervasively fraudulent scheme, which would necessarily implicate such
a broad category of evidence. Id. at 1473.
155. Id. This section authorized seizure of "evidence of association of [Ralph
Washington] with the following persons, but not limited to [the following persons]."
Id. (emphasis added). The court upheld a challenge to this section because "[a]
warrant that permits officers to seize evidence of association between a suspect
and any other person is patently overbroad." Id.
156. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984).
157. United States v. Washington, 797 F.2d 1461, 1473 (9th Cir. 1986).
158. Id. at 1472-73.
159. Id. at 1473.
160. Id. at 1473 n.16.
161. Id. at 1473.
162. Id.
163. 808 F.2d 173 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2481 (1987).
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each of which authorized the seizure of stolen cartons of clothing.' 64
There was probable cause to believe that the stolen goods were
present in three locations: (1) a wholesale distributorship; (2) a
warehouse; and (3) a retail clothing store. All three sites were owned
by the same person. 165 An informant and the manager of a store
that was to have received the clothing had told the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) agents which specific items of clothing had
been stolen, based on their observations of the items at the suspect
premises. 166 In fact, many of the cartons could be identified by
shipping labels attached to them, which indicated their legitimate
destination. 167
The court held that these warrants were not particular enough
under the fourth amendment because each failed to include all the
information available to the officers at the time. 6 The affidavit for
the warrants indicated that cartons containing the stolen items could
be identified by information printed on the shipping labels attached
to them.' 69 Also, the manager of the store which was to have received
the goods legitimately had provided the FBI with a list of the specific
styles and labels of some of the stolen garments. 170 The warrant,
however, contained none of this information. 7' As a result, the
agents seized the entire contents of the warehouse, papers and receipts
from the store, and men's clothing, a category of items that had
not even been mentioned in the warrant or affidavit. 72 Thus, the
searchers clearly did not consider that the warrant limited their
authority to any significant degree. 73 Because the warrant lacked
any mechanisms by which the agents could distinguish stolen from
lawfully-possessed goods, the warrant utterly failed to comply with
164. Id. at 174. Each of the warrants authorized FBI agents to seize the following
items:
[Clartons of women's clothing, the contents of those cartons, lists iden-
tifying the contents of the cartons, and control slips identifying the stores
intended to receive these cartons, such items being contraband and ev-
idence of a violation of [title 18, United States Code, [§] 659, Possession
of Goods Stolen from Interstate Shipments.
Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 174-75.
168. Id. at 177; see supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
169. United States v. Fuccillo, 808 F.2d 173, 178 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 2481 (1987).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 177.
173. Id. at 176-77.
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established fourth amendment requirements of which the officers
presumably should have been aware. 7 4
Another reason the good-faith exception could not apply was that
the agents' failure to include any of this readily available particu-
larized information in either the affidavit or the warrant actually
contributed to the warrant's deficiency.' Because the agents clearly
had more precise information about the stolen items sought at their
disposal, their reliance on the warrants as issued could not be said
to have been reasonable.17 6
Fuccillo, however, is not really a legitimate application of the
reasonable reliance test. The officers in this case were reckless in
failing to include all the known information in the warrant appli-
cation. 77 By seizing men's clothing, they also went beyond that
which was clear from the face of the warrant. 7 1 Under Leon, this
type of police misfeasance and bad-faith execution bars application
of the good-faith exception, apart from any particularity violation. 79
174. Id. at 176; accord Montilla Records of Puerto Rico v. Morales, 575 F.2d
324 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v. Klein, 565 F.2d 183 (1st Cir. 1977); see supra
notes 61-67 and accompanying text. Contra United States v. Shoffner, 826 F.2d
619 (7th Cir.) (better description would have thwarted rather than aided investigation,
due to nature of continuing auto theft scheme in which some named vehicles would
no longer be at site of search), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 356 (1987).
175. Fuccillo, 808 F.2d at 176-77. Negligence by police cannot be considered
objectively reasonable; when facts are misstated or summarily presented, suppression
remains an appropriate remedy. Bradley, The 'Good Faith Exception' Cases: Rea-
sonable Exercises in Futility, 60 IND. L.J. 287, 297 (1985).
176. United States v. Fuccillo, 808 F.2d 173, 178 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 2481 (1987).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 177.
179. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984). Leon expressly provided
that the good-faith exception should not apply in such a case. Id. at 918 n.19,
923.
A similar situation occurred in United States v. Strand, 761 F.2d 449 (8th Cir.
1985). The challenged warrant authorized a seizure of "stolen mail," id. at 452,
but the postal inspectors who executed the warrant seized a variety of household
items they suspected of having been stolen from the mail, id. at 453. The court
held that although the warrant was specific enough to cover the seizure of items
clearly identifiable as stolen mail (e.g., parcels and letters), that term did not literally
encompass the other items seized. Id. at 453-54. The court therefore refused to
apply the good-faith exception because the seizure far exceeded that contemplated
either by the warrant or the affidavit. Id. at 456-57. Moreover, the affidavit, which
had not been incorporated into the warrant, contained a list of items far too general
to limit the scope of the search effectively. Also, the officers seized items not even
mentioned in the affidavit. Id. at 457. The inspectors failed to demonstrate that
the household items could not have been described with greater particularity. Id.
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e. United States v. Leary
In United States v. Leary,'80 the Tenth Circuit refused to apply
the good-faith exception to a particularity-defective warrant, anal-
ogizing the circumstances before it to those of Fuccillo.18' Leary
involved a search by customs agents of the offices of F.L. Kleinberg
Company, a Boulder, Colorado export company which was suspected
of attempting to illegally export the Micro-Tel, an electronic meas-
uring device. The officers obtained a warrant'8 based on an affidavit
that alleged a scheme to export the Micro-Tel to the People's Republic
of China, without the required license, through sham "front" com-
panies in Hong Kong.' 83 The affidavit mentioned no other trans-
actions or items. 84 The agents ultimately seized twenty boxes of
business records, including some pertaining to irrelevant business
dealings, as well as personal loan and insurance documents.'85
The court held that the warrant was overbroad under the fourth
amendment because the "limitations [in the warrant] provide no
limitation at all."'18 6 Furthermore, the agents' behavior in executing
the warrant could not fall within the good-faith exception for the
same reasons as those given by the Fuccillo court. 8 7 First, the
language of the warrant failed to distinguish which items were to
be seized, and thus gave the agents license to search for more than
there was probable cause to suspect of being evidence of the alleged
crime. 8 8 Also, by not specifying that the scope of the search was
to be limited to records related to the export of the Micro-Tel, the
180. 846 F.2d 592 (10th Cir. 1988).
181. Id. at 608.
182. The warrant authorized the officers to seize the following:
Correspondence, Telex messages, contracts, invoices, purchase orders,
shipping documents, payment records, export documents, packing slips,
technical data, recorded notations and other records and communications
relating to the purchase, sale and illegal exportation of materials in
violation of the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. [§] 2778, and the
Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. App. [§] 2410.
846 F.2d at 594.'
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 601. Although the warrant mentioned two specific statutes alleged
to have been violated, reference to them was insufficient to limit the warrant's
scope because they covered too broad a range of activity. Id. These references
would have been sufficient, however, if, in addition, there was a more specific list
of items to be seized. Id. at 601 n.15.
187. United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592 (10th Cir. 1988); see United States
v. Fuccillo, 808 F.2d 173, 177-78 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2481 (1987).
188. Leary, 846 F.2d at 605.
[Vol. XVI
PARTICULARITY REQUIREMENT
agents failed to include in the warrant the more precise information
that was known to them.18 9 Finally, the court found that the agents
actually went beyond the scope of the warrant by seizing documents
entirely unrelated to business transactions. 190
The court based its holding on the Supreme Court's presumption
in Leon that "officers have a reasonable knowledge of what the
law prohibits."' 191 Without requiring officers to speculate as to future
innovations in the law, the Tenth Circuit held that, at a minimum,
"[a] reasonably well-trained officer should know that a warrant must
provide guidelines for determining what evidence may be seized."' 92
The absence of any such guidelines in the Leary warrant made it
impossible for the agents to demonstrate reasonable reliance. 193
2. Application of the Good-Faith Exception
a. United States v. Accardo
In United States v. Accardo, 94 the Eleventh Circuit held that the
phrase, "all corporate records,"'' 9 was too vague to satisfy the
fourth amendment, but not so overbroad as to bar reasonable re-
liance. 96 In Accardo, federal agents had probable cause to suspect
labor racketeering among several health care service companies. 197
An informant had told the agents about kickbacks being paid to
union officials, and the diversion of revenues for this purpose by
channeling funds through two sham companies, Pinckard and For-
tune. 19 The agents obtained a warrant authorizing a search of the
administrative offices of both companies for "all corporate records,"
resulting in the seizure of a great number of documents. 99
In the case of both companies, the government had probable cause
to believe in the existence of widespread fraud2°°-a situation that
typically has justified a less stringent particularity requirement under
189. Id. at 604.
190. Id. at 608-09.
191. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919 n.20 (1984).
192. Leary, 846 F.2d at 609.
193. Id.
194. 749 F.2d 1477 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 949 (1985).
195. Id. at 1481.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1478.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1479.
200. Id. at 1481.
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the fourth amendment. 01 The court discussed the similarity between
the Accardo warrant and the one at issue in United States v. Offices
Known as 50 State Distributing Co.,202 a case decided prior to Leon.
In 50 State, the warrant's authorization of an extensive search for
the records of a business alleged to be pervasively fraudulent was
held to satisfy the fourth amendment requirement that the description
be "as specific as the circumstances and nature of activity under
investigation permit. "203
The Accardo court noted that, in light of the holding in 50 State,
"the magistratewho issued these warrants might have had reason
to authorize the seizure of 'all corporate records.' ,,2o Nevertheless,
the Eleventh Circuit chose to apply the good-faith exception, main-
taining that "[tihe question here is not the legal validity of the
warrant but the reasonableness of the officers' reliance on it. ' ' 20
As in Sheppard, the agents in Accardo took every step they could
to ensure that the warrant complied with the fourth amendment. 206
They submitted a detailed affidavit to a neutral magistrate, after
having it reviewed by government attorneys. 207 Unlike Sheppard,
however, no special assurance by the magistrate was necessary because
there was no potential defect or overbreadth in the form of the
warrant of which the officers were or should have been aware prior
to its review by the magistrate. 20 Finally, the breadth of probable
cause, of which the officers were aware, signaled to them that the
phrase, "all corporate records," was not necessarily overbroad in
this situation. Because the officers knew how extensive the fraud
was, it was reasonable for them to believe that this entire category
of items was to be seized.209
Had the court applied the traditionally accepted standards for
particularity under the fourth amendment as articulated in 50 State,
the warrant could have been held valid under the fourth amendment,
and thus the search would have been constitutional. The requirements
for particularity under the fourth amendment have been interpreted
201. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
202. 708 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1021 (1984).
* 203. United States v. Wuagnuex, 683 F.2d 1343, 1349 (11th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 814 (1983); see 50 State, 708 F.2d at 1374.
204. United States v. Accardo, 749 F.2d 1477, 1479 n.3 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 949 (1985).
205. Id. at 1481.
206. Id. at 1480.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1480-81.
209. Id. at 1481.
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flexibly enough to permit this type of search, without resort to the
good-faith exception.
210
b. United States v. Michaelian
The Ninth Circuit did apply the good-faith exception to a par-
ticularity violation in United States v. Michaelian .211 Michaelian in-
volved a "cash-skimming" scheme in which the defendant's business
issued bogus checks and then claimed the payments as tax-deductible
expenses. 212 The court let stand the district court's determination
that the warrant was unconstitutionally overbroad .2 1  Nevertheless,
the court applied the good-faith exception because the warrant and
affidavit each had been reviewed and approved by four levels of
government attorneys. 21 4 Moreover, the degree of the warrant's facial
210. See supra notes 16-31, 52-89 and accompanying text.
211. 803 F.2d 1042 (9th Cir. 1986).
212. Id. at 1044.
213. Id. at 1046. The warrant in Michaelian read in pertinent part as follows:
[C]ertain documents and records of Ara Michaelian and Ara Explorations,
Inc., . . . including the cancelled checks, bank statements and deposit
slips, check registers, check stubs, customer order records and inventory
records, lists of employees, cash disbursements journals, general ledgers,
copies of federal and California state income tax returns and accountants
work papers for . . . Ara Michaelian, d/b/a Ara Valve and Fitting Co.,
for the years 1978 through 1980, and Ara Explorations, Inc., for the
years 1981 through the present, which are fruits, evidence and instru-
mentalities of criminal offenses against the United States, namely, attempts
to evade or defeat federal income tax and aiding, assisting and advising
the preparation of false and fraudulent income tax returns, in violation
of [t]itle 26, United States Code, [§§] 7201 and 7206(2) and conspiring
to defraud the United States by impeding, impairing, obstructing and
defeating the lawful functions of the Treasury Department in the collection
of income taxes, in violation of [t]itle 18, United States Code, [§] 371
and any and all fruits, instrumentalities and evidence (at this time un-
known) of the crimes which facts recited in the accompanying affidavit
make out.
Id. at 1046 n.1. The court held this warrant unconstitutional because it could have
been more specific in light of the extensive investigation conducted. Id. at 1046.
214. Id. at 1047. In rejecting the respondent's contention that the good-faith
exception should not apply because the affiant officers caused the deficiency in
the warrant, the court in Michaelian held that Sheppard does not "limit the
circumstances in which an officer's reliance may be reasonable to a situation in
which the judge is the source of the warrant's deficiency; it only holds that such
a situation may present such circumstances." Id. Although it agreed with the
statement in Leon that an affiant cannot submit a "bare-bones" affidavit and then
rely on good-faith execution by an unsuspecting fellow officer, United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 n.24 (1984), the Michaelian court implied that an inadvertent
mistake by an affiant will not spoil good-faith execution by a fellow officer.
Michaelian, 803 F.2d at 1047. This view diverges somewhat from the main thrust
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deficiency did not approach that present in Crozier.2 15 The warrant's
authorization to seize documents was limited to that period of years
in which the defendant controlled the suspect enterprise, and it did
not include more general categories of documents, such as corre-
spondence.216
Based on the facts of Michaelian, it is not clear why the Ninth
Circuit simply did not uphold the search under the fourth amend-
ment, rather than the good-faith exception. One possible reason is
that the court could achieve its desired result-that of sanctioning
the search and allowing the use of its results-without reversing the
conclusion of the lower court.2 17 It seems clear, however, that-as
in Accardo-the degree of descriptiveness in this warrant and the
fact that specific criminal offenses were listed by statute and de-
scribed, could permit a finding that the warrant was valid under
the fourth amendment.2 18
c. United States v. Buck
In United States v. Buck,21 9 the Second Circuit took a different
approach to finding a basis for reasonable reliance. The case involved
Marilyn Buck's participation in two 1981 robberies of Brinks armored
cars.20 The warrant in question authorized the police to search for
and seize "any papers, things or property of any kind relating to
previously described crime." ' 22' The judge had dictated the warrant
of Leon, which extended the good-faith exception to situations where the deterrent
effect of exclusion would be more than marginal, including those in which police
officers are responsible for the deficiency in a warrant. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.
Moreover, the court in Michaelian could have found this warrant constitutional
because the existence of a complex scheme involving fraudulent transactions rendered
the description in the warrant sufficiently particular. See supra notes 80-82, 200-
04 and accompanying text.
215. United States v. Michaelian, 803 F.2d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 1986).
216. 1d.
217. Id. at 1046.
218. See supra notes 16-31, 57-60 and accompanying text.
219. 813 F.2d 588 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 167 (1987).
220. Id. at 589-90. The indictment charged several crimes, including: (1) eight
counts of conspiracy to violate RICO; (2) participation in a racketeering enterprise
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, 1962(c), 1962(d); and (3) bank robbery, armed
bank robbery and murder during an armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2113(a), 2113(d) and 2113(e), respectively. Buck, 813 F.2d at 589.
221. Buck, 813 F.2d at 590. The items actually seized from Buck's home in
reliance on the warrant included a .45 caliber semiautomatic rifle, 9 mm. handgun,
bowie knife, blowgun, chuka sticks, ammunition, gun-cleaning kits, sawed-off
shotgun barrel and butt, wigs, a false mustache and make-up kit, insurance doc-
uments covering the white Oldsmobile in which Buck was seen escaping from the
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to a police detective over the telephone, based on the detective's
verbal description of the crimes and of his evidentiary basis for
suspecting Buck. 222
The court in Buck found the warrant unconstitutionally overbroad
because it was "all in general boilerplate terms, without either explicit
or implicit limitation on the scope of the search.' '223 In addition,
as in Fuccillo, 24 the officers "clearly did not insure that all the
known facts were included in the warrant. 2 25 Nevertheless, the
Second Circuit applied the good-faith exception in Buck despite the
warrant's use of a patently inadequate "catch-all" phrase, 226 because
the officers had made "considerable efforts to comply with the
dictates of the [flourth [a]mendment. "227
crime, detailed bomb-making diagrams, a bomb-detonating device and several house-
hold items that the diagram indicated would be of some use in making a homemade
bomb. Id.
222. Id. at 589-90.
223. Id. at 591; cf. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 479 (1976) (warrant
authorizing search for "other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this
[time] unknown" was limited adequately by preceding detailed list of documents,
and context clearly indicated that "crime" referred specifically to charges involving
fraudulent real estate transactions); United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 758 (2d
Cir. 1984) (warrant containing challenged phrase, "and other evidence of a con-
spiracy to distribute and of the distribution and possession with intent to distribute
of narcotic drug controlled substances," upheld because this list was preceded by
list of specific items), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985); United States v. Dunloy,
584 F.2d 6, 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1978) (warrant to search bank safe deposit box containing
"'a quantity of cocaine, and additionally, all narcotic drug controlled substances,
documents, records and other evidence of distribution and possession with intent
to distribute narcotic drug controlled substances"' upheld because more particular
description of box's contents was impossible, and area to be searched was "extremely
confined").
224. See supra notes 163-79 and accompanying text.
225. United States v. Buck, 813 F.2d 588, 592 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 167 (1987); see also Young, 745 F.2d at 759.
226. Buck, 813 F.2d at 593. Contra United States v. Crozier, 777 F.2d 1376,
1381-82 (9th Cir. 1985) (authorization in affidavit to search for "any indicia of
ownership and control of the premises" coupled with no description of specific
property in warrant held to bar reasonable reliance); United States v. Viers, 637
F. Supp. 1343, 1348-50 (W.D. Ky. 1986) (description including words "other things
of value" leaves so much discretion in officer that reasonably well-trained officer
would not believe it had been properly issued).
227. Buck, 813 F.2d at 592. These "considerable efforts" included: (1) seeking
out a neutral magistrate; (2) tape-recording the conversation with the magistrate
to ensure accuracy; (3) outlining the crime for the magistrate; (4) describing the
evidence that led them to Buck's home; and (5) swearing to their assertions under
oath. Id. at 592-93. Such efforts seem less "considerable" than those that are
minimally required of reasonably well-trained officers. For example, the court noted
that the officers "clearly did not insure that all the known facts were included in
the warrant." Id. at 592. This undermines the court's conclusion that the officers'
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The officers' only failure, according to the court, was their inability
to predict that the court would find such "catch-all" phrases un-
constitutional. 228 No reasonably well-trained officer could be expected
to anticipate a prospective judicial determination that catch-all terms
violate the fourth amendment. 2 9 Therefore, in the absence of any
clearly established law to the contrary, these officers had no reason
not to "rely upon the objectively reasonable legal conclusions of
an issuing judge." 23°
The Second Circuit appears to have adopted its reasoning in Buck
from a series of Supreme Court cases that essentially form a civil
analog to Leon.231 These cases applied an "objectively reasonable"
standard to claims of good-faith immunity from civil damages under
section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code.232 The first of
these cases, Harlow v. Fitzgerald,23  held that government officials
should be immune from civil damages in the performance of dis-
cretionary functions based on the "objective reasonableness of an
official's conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established
laws. ' 234 The Court in Harlow presumed that "a reasonably com-
efforts were "considerable." In fact, such an omission more closely resembles the
type of behavior contemplated by Leon as barring application of the good-faith
exception. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984); see also United States
v. Fuccillo, 808 F.2d 173, 178 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2481 (1987). But
see United States v. Michaelian, 803 F.2d 1042 (9th Cir. 1986) (some police error
will not necessarily preclude application of good-faith exception).
228. Buck, 813 F.2d at 593.
229. Id.
230. Id.; see also Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 989-90 (1984) (officers
not required to doubt assurances of magistrate that warrant was valid as issued).
In Sheppard, however, the officers requested the magistrate's assurances in order
to dispel their doubts about the warrant's validity-doubts that had been raised
by their own awareness of the warrant's possible overbreadth. Id. In Buck, only
the general language itself would have put the officers on notice of the warrant's
potential invalidity. Buck, 813 F.2d at 592-93.
231. See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987); Malley v. Briggs,
106 S. Ct. 1092 (1986); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
232. Anderson, 107 S. Ct. at 3038; Malley, 106 S. Ct. at 1098; Harlow, 457
U.S. at 818.
233. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
234. Id. at 818. The Second Circuit's language in Buck, 813 F.2d at 593 ("[wjhat
the officers failed to do was anticipate our holding today that the particularity
clause of the [flourth [almendment prohibits the use of a catch-all description in
a search warrant"), is a fair echo of that used by the Supreme Court in Harlow,
457 U.S. at 818 ("[i]f the law at that time was not clearly established, an official
could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments, nor
could he fairly be said to 'know' that the law forbade conduct previously identified
as unlawful").
PARTICULARITY REQUIREMENT
petent public official should know the law governing his conduct, '235
but would hold government officials liable only for violations of
those "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known. '236
The Court applied this rule in a criminal context in Malley v.
Briggs,237 which held that a police officer who applies for an arrest
warrant by submitting an affidavit to a judge is not automatically
entitled to qualified immunity. 21 Instead, the officer must have some
objectively reasonable basis to believe that there is a sufficient legal
foundation for the warrant to issue, independent of the judge's
approval. 23 9 This notion-that the act of applying for a warrant is
not per se objectively reasonable24°-was stated expressly in Leon as
well. 241
Thus, in Buck, the officers could not be charged with the knowl-
edge that the warrant was too general242 because "the existing cases
left considerable ambiguity as to the exact requirements of the
particularity clause going far beyond the ambiguity inherent in every
new application of the law. ' 243 There was Second Circuit and Su-
preme Court precedent to suggest that the type of "catch-all" phrase
invalidated in Buck could not pass constitutional muster without
some type of limitation. As the Buck court itself observed, the
Second Circuit previously had upheld warrants containing similarly
broad language as constitutional, only because the warrants contained
some intrinsic limitation on their language. 2"4 In addition, the Su-
preme Court in Andresen v. Maryland245 had required the presence
235. Id. at 819.
236. Id. at 818 (emphasis added).
237. 106 S. Ct. 1092 (1986).
238. Id. at 1096.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1093.
241. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 n.23 (officer may be held to
knowledge of warrant's unconstitutionality "despite the magistrate's authorization").
242. Id. at 923.
243. United States v. Buck, 813 F.2d 588, 593 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 167 (1987). Buck noted that the Third Circuit-the jurisdiction in which the
search was conducted-had not "spelled out the particularity requirement." Id.
244. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 758 (2d Cir. 1984) (phrase,
"and other evidence of a conspiracy to distribute ... narcotic controlled sub-
stances," upheld because it followed a list of specific items (emphasis added)),
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985); United States v. Dunloy, 584 F.2d 6, 8, 10-
11 (2d Cir. 1978) (authorization to seize "other evidence of distribution and
possession with intent to distribute narcotic controlled substances" upheld because
it was preceded by a list of some specific items, and the area to be searched, a
bank safe deposit box, was extremely limited).
245. 427 U.S. 463 (1975).
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of some limiting language or list of items when a catch-all "tail"
was used.
2 46
Until Buck, however, no court had proscribed the use of certain
inherently unparticular language in all situations. 241 In interpreting
the particularity requirement under the fourth amendment, courts
traditionally had been concerned with whether the warrant, taken
as a whole, either gave the searchers \authority to go beyond that
for which there was probable cause to search, or allowed them to
use discretion in selecting which items or places satisfied an am-
biguous description. 24 Later, under the good-faith exception, courts
considered whether an insufficiently particularized warrant never-
theless gave officers some reasonable basis to presume that they had
the proper authority to search. 249 The only "clearly established law"
that officers had to be aware of was the basic constitutional re-
quirement that the warrant not give rise to a general search. 2 0 Beyond
that, however, there was no clear law regarding what specific form
of language either was required or prohibited under the fourth
amendment, such that reliance on it would be per se unreasonable.
Instead, the reasonableness of any search depended upon many
factors apart from the actual wording of the warrant.2 1'
In Anderson v. Creighton,25 2 another civil good-faith case, the
Supreme Court held that under the "clearly established law" stan-
dard, whether an official will be "objectively reasonable," and
therefore in good faith, "depends substantially upon the level of
generality at which the relevant legal rule is to be identified. '253
Although the Court held that the particular circumstances of a case
are relevant to a determination of what information an officer
possessed, 254 "[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear
[such] that a reasonable official would understand that what he is
doing violates that right. '255
It therefore appears that under Buck, nothing less than an absolute
prohibition on an unlimited "catch-all" phrase would satisfy the
Supreme Court's requirement that "the unlawfulness must be ap-
246. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 16-89, 122-218 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 16-89 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 90-230 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 1-3, 16-89 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 16-89 and accompanying text.
252. 107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987).
253. Id. at 3038.
254. Id. at 3040.
255. Id. at 3039.
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parent. '256 Neither the inherent vagueness of the Buck warrant's
unlimited command to search for "any papers, things or property
of any kind relating to previously described crime, ' 25 7 nor the earlier
holdings that suggested that similarly broad phrases require some
specific list of items, 258 would be sufficient for a court to charge a
reasonably well-trained officer with knowledge that the warrant vi-
olated the fourth amendment. 25 9
IV. The Effect of United States v. Buck on the Reasonable
Reliance Exception
The Second Circuit's holding in United States v. Buck that, absent
"clearly established law" to the contrary, an officer may presume
a warrant valid, represents a departure from the approach taken in
the other "reasonable reliance" cases, including Massachusetts v.
Sheppard. Prior to Buck, the "reasonable reliance" inquiry focused
on whether the. warrant was so substantially deficient in particularity
that, in light of all the circumstances surrounding his application
for and execution of the warrant, a reasonably well-trained officer
should have doubted his authority to search under the warrant,
"despite the magistrate's authorization."26°
The practical result of this approach to "reasonable reliance,"
however, has been that the good-faith exception has been applied
in situations where there may have been no particularity violation
to begin with. 261 This is because many of the factors that limit an
officer's discretion, and thus enable a search to comply with the
fourth amendment, 262 are the same as those that courts consider
256. Id. In a footnote to Buck, the Second Circuit stated the following:
[O]ur decision today means that, with respect to searches conducted
hereafter, police officers may no longer invoke the reasonable reliance
exception to the exclusionary rule when they attempt to introduce as
evidence the fruits of searches undertaken on the basis of warrants
containing only a catch-all description of the property to be seized.
United States v. Buck, 813 F.2d 588, 593 n.2 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
167 (1987).
257. Buck, 813 F.2d at 590.
258. See supra notes 244-46 and accompanying text.
259. Although Leon spoke of a "reasonably well-trained officer," 468 U.S. 897,
923 (1984), Harlow v. Fitzgerald referred to those rights of which "a reasonable
person" would have known, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). This raises the question of
whether a police officer, educated both by experience and departmental regulations,
should be held to a higher standard of knowledge than a "reasonable person."
260. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23.
261. See, e.g., United States v. Accardo, 749 F.2d 1477 (lth Cir.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 949 (1985).
262. See supra notes 16-89 and accompanying text.
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when deciding whether an officer exhibited the requisite "reasonable
reliance" for the good-faith exception to apply.263 Traditional analysis
under the fourth amendment considers only whether the language
used in the warrant, considering all of the circumstances surrounding
the application for and execution of the warrant, provides enough
guidance for the searcher in order to prevent a general search.264
The standard used by a majority of the circuits for applying the
good-faith exception to particularity defects is substantially the same,
except that the court need only find that the language was sufficiently
particular to permit the officer to presume that the authorized search
was legal.265 This malleable standard for particularity has produced
such anomalous results as United States v. Accardo,26 in which the
Eleventh Circuit applied the good-faith exception because the ex-
istence of probable cause to suspect extensive fraud rendered a general
authorization to search for "all corporate records" reliable under
those circumstances. 267 This clearly was a case in which the court
could simply have upheld the search under the fourth amendment,
rather than the good-faith exception. 268
263. See supra notes 104-218 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 16-89 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 90-259 and accompanying text.
266. 749 F.2d 1477 (lth Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 949 (1985).
267. See supra notes 194-210 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text. Professor LaFave has observed
that the Supreme Court's application of the good-faith exception in Sheppard-
which, he contends, presented no fourth amendment violation, see supra note 114-
invited lower courts to apply the exception in other situations in which the legality
of the search could be sustained on constitutional grounds instead. LaFave, supra
note 12, at 912-14, 930. "The temptation will be great," he wrote, "to treat
virtually any grant of search authority by a judicial officer as an iron-clad barrier
to any meaningful inquiry into the [c]onstitutionality of that authorization." Id.
at 930.
Experience seems to have borne out LaFave's fears. Neither the Michaelian court
nor the Accardo court engaged in any meaningful discussion of what made the
warrants in question unconstitutional, before progressing to a reasonable reliance
analysis. See United States v. Michaelian, 803 F.2d 1042 (9th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Accardo, 749 F.2d 1477 (lth Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 949 (1985);
see also United States v. Maggitt, 778 F.2d 1029, 1033 (5th Cir. 1985) (determination
of search warrant's invalidity not always necessary before reaching issue of good-
faith exception), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 (1986). In United States v. Bonner,
808 F.2d 864 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1632 (1987), the court actually
applied the good-faith exception after finding the warrant constitutional. Id. at
867. In 1984, Professor LaFave wrote that he found it "disturbing ... that the
Court would adopt a good-faith rule ... where, in all likelihood, there was no
fourth amendment violation in the first place." LaFave, supra note 12, at 911.
No doubt, several of the decisions since rendered would serve to intensify his
disturbance.
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Buck, on the other hand, involved precisely the type of warrant
Leon and Sheppard contemplated as being "so facially deficient"
that an officer could not reasonably presume it to be valid.269 The
use of a catch-all phrase with no specific listing of items clearly
permitted what amounted to "general rummaging.' '270 Neither the
actual language of the warrant in Buck271 nor the circumstances
surrounding its execution 272 adequately limited the officers' discretion
in searching Buck's home or in seizing her property. 273 Nevertheless,
the court sanctioned the execution of this patently overbroad warrant
because, absent any clearly established legal precedent barring the
use of such language, the officer was entitled to rely on the judge's
authorization 274
The situation in Buck resembled that of United States v. Leary,275
in which the Tenth Circuit did not apply the good-faith exception. 276
While it noted the Second Circuit's earlier holding in Buck, the
Leary court held the searchers responsible for knowing that a warrant
must contain at least some guidelines for determining what may be
seized. 277 The court held that it was "not expecting the agents to
anticipate legal determinations or resolve ambiguities in the law"
by presuming that officers possess this basic degree of knowledge.2 78
In view of both the decision in Leary and Second Circuit precedent
in the area of particularity, 27 9 Buck appears to have set an artificially
high threshhold for how explicit the law must be in order to qualify
as "clearly established." In addition, Buck failed to recognize that
some warrants provide so little direction or guidance as to what the
scope of the search should be that no objectively reasonable officer
could presume the warrant's authorization to search was valid, apart
269. See supra notes 10-13, 98-106 and accompanying text.
270. United States v. Buck, 813 F.2d 588 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 167
(1987). "General rummaging" may occur in one of three ways: (1) where there is
a failure to describe the objects sought with sufficient particularity; (2) where all
objects in a class must be examined in order to locate a specific thing; or (3) via
"general exploratory rummaging," in which there is no specific object of the search.
Galloway, supra note 2, at 141-45.
271. See, e.g., United States v. Michaelian, 803 F.2d 1042 (9th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Strand, 761 F.2d 449 (8th Cir. 1985).
272. See, e.g, United States v. Accardo, 749 F.2d 1477 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 949 (1985).
273. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 226-59 and accompanying text.
275. 846 F.2d 592 (10th Cir. 1988).
276. See supra notes 180-93 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
278. Leary, 846 F.2d at 609.
279. See supra notes 53-56, 244-46 and accompanying text.
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from whether there was any clearly established law in that juris-
diction. 210 Under the logic of Buck, even if further scrutiny of such
a warrant would demonstrate to the officers that it provides them
with inadequate guidance to search, the very fact that the magistrate
issued such a warrant would be sufficient to dispel this presumed
doubt, assuming no clearly established law in that jurisdiction of
which the officer should have been aware. 28 1
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit's reference to clearly established
law as a basis for reasonable reliance ultimately is preferable to the
ad hoc approach taken by other courts.28 2 The holding in Buck
addresses the concern that "[wjithout some articulate guidelines, a
freestanding reasonableness standard is difficult and perhaps even
dangerous for appellate judges to apply. '283 Under the rationale of
Buck, once the law in a particular jurisdiction clearly states that a
certain type of description violates the fourth amendment, apparently
nothing else will justify an officer's execution of that warrant. 2 4
This will make it more difficult for officers to be "wrong but
reasonable" in relying on a defective warrant, because a court need
only consider whether the law in that jurisdiction was clearly es-
tablished regarding the type of warrant at issue before evaluating
the legitimacy of the search. Thus, Buck actually encourages those
courts that desire to protect the exclusionary rule from encroachment
by the reasonable reliance exception to establish clearer standards
for particularity. Moreover, the creation of clear prohibitions on
certain types of language may discourage officers from executing
280. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984). Shortly after the decision
in Sheppard, which she called a "bizarre situation," Chief Judge Patricia Wald
interpreted the opinion to mean that "when a magistrate has already found that
probable cause exists and has issued a warrant, a police officer's reliance on the
magistrate's decision will apparently be objectively reasonable on almost any facts."
Wald, supra note 14, at 88. This observation seems particularly prescient in light
of Buck.
281. United States v. Buck, 813 F.2d 588, 593 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 167 (1987). Professor LaFave has expressed concern that such use of the
reasonable reliance exception would encourage magistrate-shopping. LaFave, supra
note 12, at 914; see also Bloom, supra note 8, at 252. But see Leon, 468 U.S.
at 922 n.23 (rejection of warrant by one magistrate undermines officer's ability to
reasonably rely on approval by subsequent magistrate).
282. A magistrate who abdicates his neutral and detached role creates an in-
dependent basis for suspension of the good-faith exception. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923;
see also Lo-Ji Sales v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 327 (1979). Under Leon, whether
a warrant is facially sufficient to support official belief in its validity is a separate
inquiry from whether the magistrate acted properly. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.
283. Wald, supra note 14, at 88.
284. Buck, 813 F.2d at 593.
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questionable warrants due to the likelihood that the good-faith ex-
ception will be unavailable.
Buck erred only in setting too stringent a standard for how clear
the established law regarding particularity must be. Rather than
looking to see whether certain language has been expressly invali-
dated, courts adopting the clearly established law standard should
charge all officers with knowledge of the clearly established fourth
amendment requirement that warrants provide some guidelines for
the search, as Leary held.285 A presumption of this basic knowledge
of what the fourth amendment does require in all cases286 would
result in a more consistent application of the exclusionary rule to
those warrants that Leon and Sheppard anticipated as being inher-
ently unreliable.
V. Conclusion
The definition of "particularity" traditionally has been dealt with
as a concept, rather than as a rule. While a flexible notion of
particularity is appropriate under a conventional fourth amendment
analysis because of the great variety of situations in which searches
occur, application of the good-faith exception demands a greater
degree of regularity and predictability. By predicating reasonable
reliance on the existence of some clearly established law regarding
particularity, Buck injects a desirable consistency and clarity into
application of the good-faith exception.
Martha Applebaum
285. See supra notes 180-93 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 17-89 and accompanying text.
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